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 
Abstract— We developed a countermeasure against blinding 
attacks on low-noise detectors with a background noise 
cancellation scheme in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. 
Background noise cancellation includes self-differencing and 
balanced avalanche photon diode (APD) schemes and is 
considered a promising solution for low-noise APDs, which are 
critical components in high-performance QKD systems. However, 
its vulnerability to blinding attacks has been recently reported. In 
this work, we propose a new countermeasure that prevents this 
potential security loophole from being used in detector blinding 
attacks. An experimental QKD setup is implemented and various 
tests are conducted to verify the feasibility and performance of the 
proposed method. The obtained measurement results show that 
the proposed scheme successfully detects occurring 
blinding-attack-based hacking attempts. 
 
Index Terms—Countermeasure, low-noise avalanche photon 
diode, quantum hacking, quantum key distribution. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
uantum key distribution (QKD) systems are being actively 
studied and pursued [1–13]. In the commercial arena, in 
particular, great progresses have been recently achieved in the 
area of high-speed QKD and long distance quantum network 
systems [14–25]. Many studies on QKD security have been 
also conducted uninterruptedly since 1984, because providing 
security is essential for the commercialization of such systems. 
Many research groups have focused on quantum hacking and 
countermeasures against it, to overcome loopholes resulting 
from the imperfections of hardware devices. In fact, attempts to 
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hack avalanche photon diodes (APDs) have posed real threats 
to commercial QKD systems, although there have been many 
applicable hacking methods including blinding, time shifting, 
detector dead time, phase remapping, Trojan horses, Faraday 
mirrors, wavelength, phase information, and device calibration 
attacks [26–41]. In the research area of avalanche photon 
diodes, there has been remarkable progress in terms of higher 
speed and lower noise operations. In particular, avalanche 
photon diodes with background noise cancellation (BNC) 
schemes which include self-differencing and balanced APDs 
have been highlighted, because of their superior characteristics 
of GHz-speed operation and lower after-pulse noise [42–47]. It 
has been reported that QKD systems with self-differencing 
avalanche photon diodes can also be hacked [48]. However, 
threats to QKD systems with balanced APDs have not been 
mentioned yet. In this paper, we show a hacking method 
applicable to balanced APDs and propose a countermeasure 
scheme against such quantum hacking. In the following 
sections, we will discuss the concept of quantum hacking and 
its countermeasures. An experimental setup for verification 
will then be presented. Finally, some test results and the 
corresponding analysis will be discussed at length. In addition, 
we will briefly note that our countermeasure can also be used in 
self-differencing schemes. 
II. BLINDING SINGLE PHOTON DETECTORS 
 TO ENABLE QUANTUM HACKING 
As mentioned above, APDs with a BNC scheme constitute a 
promising solution for QKD systems, because of their superior 
noise characteristics. Normally, APDs are affected by two 
types of noise: dark count and after-pulse noises. Cooling the 
APD can easily reduce the dark count noise; however, this 
results in an increase of the after-pulse noise. Therefore, 
specific techniques are required to reduce the after-pulse noise 
while maintaining the same (or less) dark count noise. From 
this point of view, the BNC scheme is currently considered the 
most efficient technique for reducing the after pulse noise. 
However, it has been disclosed that the scheme is susceptible to 
blinding attacks. Having been originally designed to remove 
background noise, the BNC scheme removes both successive 
and simultaneous avalanche signals alike. The cancellation of 
avalanche signals means that an APD can be easily blinded. 
Fig. 1 demonstrates one of the BNC schemes (balanced 
APD), and shows how it can be attacked using its avalanche 
signal cancelation behavior. In this scheme, the output 
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difference between two avalanche photo diodes (APDs) is 
delivered to the comparators (Comp), so that the background 
noise is cancelled, as shown by pulse (a) in Fig. 1. Normally, 
amplifiers are located between Diff amp and Comp to adjust the 
amount of background noise signals from two APDs so that two 
signals have similar value. This adjustment scheme do not 
effect on the performance of APDs and the attack threat by Eve. 
If an avalanche signal is generated only in APD 1, positive and 
negative signals occur in Comp 1 and Comp 2, respectively 
[Fig. 1, pulse (b)]. In the similar way, if an avalanche signal is 
generated only in APD2, negative and positive signal occur in 
Comp 1 and Comp 2, respectively [Fig.1, pulse (c)]. In both 
cases, the APD can correctly detect an avalanche signal with 
low background noise. However, if an avalanche signal is 
generated simultaneously in both APDs, the two avalanche 
signal contributions will cancel each other, resulting in APD 
blinding [Fig. 1, pulse (d)]. Therefore, an eavesdropper (Eve) 
can easily blind the APD by applying strong laser pulses to both 
APDs simultaneously. By blinding the APDs, Eve can herself 
control the QKD system without increasing the quantum bit 
error rate (QBER), and thus succeed in hacking the system. In 
the next section, we discuss how to hack practical plug and play 
(P&P) QKD systems using an intercept-and-resend method 
[27]. 
III. QUANTUM HACKING OF PLUG AND PLAY QKD SYSTEMS 
WITH A BALANCED APD SCHEME 
The intercept-and-resend is one of the critical QKD hacking 
methods. It is well known that, with this method, Eve can only 
get full secret keys from practical QKD systems if she blinds 
and controls the detectors [27]. The concept of an 
intercept-and-resend method on a P&P QKD system is shown 
in Fig. 2. The concept involves four different entities: Alice, 
Bob, Eve–Bob, and Eve–Alice. Eve–Bob is designed to 
intercept the phase information from Alice and allow Eve to 
resend a single photon with modified phase from Eve–Alice to 
Bob. The attack proceeds as follows: 
1) Bob generates and sends strong laser pulses to Alice. Before 
the arrival of these strong laser pulses to the Eve–Alice 
phase modulator, Eve–Bob generates strong laser pulses to 
Alice. 
2) Alice randomly modulates (0, π/2, π, 3π/2) the phase of the 
strong laser pulses generated by Eve–Bob, and the 
modulated laser pulses return back to Eve–Bob (the 
intercept part). The phases (0, π) belong to basis 0 and (π/2, 
3π/2) do to basis 1. 
3) Eve–Bob modulates 0 (basis 0) or π /2 (basis 1) randomly 
and guesses the phase information of Alice using the click 
information from Eve–Bob’s APDs. 
4) If Alice and Eve-Bob have same bases, Eve can have correct 
phase information of Alice. On the other hand, if they have 
different bases, Eve can get only 50% correct phase 
information because an avalanche occurs in one of the 
APDs (randomly determined, with a 50 % probability). 
However, Eve guesses the phase information based on only 
Eve-Bob’s APD clicks. And the 50% error is eliminated 
through sifting process and Eve’s blinding attack as 
described in step 7), 8) and 9). 
5) Eve-Bob transmits the guessed phase information to 
Eve-Alice, and Eve-Alice then modulates this phase 
information when Bob’s original signal arrives at Eve-Alice. 
The modulated laser pulses will be resent to Bob, to 
generate APD clicks on Bob (the resend part). 
6) Eve-Alice’s modulated basis will either equal or differ from 
Bob’s modulated basis. If equality is achieved, Eve can 
obtain all the secure keys from the P&P QKD system 
without increasing the QBER. If, however, the modulated 
bases differ, the APD clicks on Bob become error counts, 
and the QBER is therefore increased. 
7) When Bob’s APDs click, Alice, Bob, and Eve can obtain 
raw keys based on basis or APD click information. Alice 
FIG. 1. Block diagram and timing chart of the balanced APD method with 
an attempted blinding attack. 
 
APD: Avalanche photo diode; Diff Amp: Differential amplifier; Amp: 
Amplifier; Comp: Comparator; SPD: Single photon detector. 
FIG. 2. Block diagram of an intercept-and-resend method on a plug and play 
QKD system. 
 
QC: Quantum channel. 
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and Bob will then try to do a sifting processing through the 
classical channel. If the two parties have different bases, 
each part discards the raw keys. Eve hacks into the classical 
channel and also discards the raw keys (as Alice and Bob do) 
during the sifting processing. As a result, they obtain 
equally sifted keys, which will be the base of the secure keys 
in P&P QKD systems. 
8) After the sifting process, Eve still has a major problem to 
solve, in the intercept-and-resend method. If the guessed 
phase information, based on Eve-Alice’s basis, agrees with 
Bob’s basis, all the APD clicks on Bob become sifting keys. 
However, Eve cannot know for sure which APD clicks 
become sifting keys and which become error counts. For 
example, if Eve-Bob’s guessed phase is equal to Bob’s 
phase, there will be a correct sifting key. However, if the 
guessed phase is wrong, there is an error count with a 50 % 
probability. As a result, Eve can be easily exposed by the 
increase of QBER caused by such error counts. 
9) However, if Eve uses the discussed blinding attack method 
to the P&P QKD system, Bob’s APDs will be blind and 
cannot generate any APD clicks; this means that there will 
be no QBER increase when Eve-Bob’s guessed phase is 
different from Bob’s phase. By providing not single photon 
but many photons from Eve to Bob, Eve can blind only 
when the guessed phase is different. If the guessed phase is 
the same, the APDs operate properly. As a result, Eve can 
control Bob’s APDs to generate APD clicks only when 
Eve-Bob’s and Bob’s phase are equal. 
 
This means that Eve can successfully obtain all the sifting 
keys without an increase in QBER. Plug and play systems using 
low noise APDs therefore need a new countermeasure scheme 
to thwart APD blinding attacks. 
IV. COUNTERMEASURE SCHEME 
Fig. 3 shows the proposed countermeasure (CM) scheme, 
designed to thwart blinding attacks on QKD systems with a 
balanced APDs. The major purpose of the CM scheme is to 
detect the double click of APD 1 and 2 that blinds the APDs. 
Weak avalanches and strong avalanches are also detected and 
distinguished, by using logic gates on a field-programmable 
gate array (FPGA). A strong avalanche means that the output 
signal is larger than the background noise. If the output 
avalanche signal is smaller than the background noise, we call it 
a weak avalanche.  The countermeasure consists of two splitters 
(S1 and S2), four comparators (Comp A, Comp B, Comp C, 
and Comp D), and an FPGA implementing the countermeasure 
scheme logic. Each APD (APD 1 and APD 2) is connected to 
one splitter (S1 and S2). Each splitter has one port to connect it 
to either Comp A or Comp B, and a second port to connect it to 
either the positive or negative input of the differential amplifier 
(see Fig. 3). The negative and positive outputs of the 
differential amplifier (Diff amp) are connected to Comp C and 
Comp D, respectively. Comp A and Comp B can detect strong 
avalanches in APD 1 or APD 2, and the differential amplifier 
evaluates the difference between the APD 1 and APD 2 output 
signals. If an avalanche occurs in APD 1, an output signal is 
generated in Comp C; conversely, if an avalanche signal occurs 
in APD 2, a signal is generated in Comp D. The CM is designed 
to detect attempted blinding attacks using simultaneous weak 
and strong avalanche signals. As shown in Fig. 3 [pulse (a)], if a 
strong avalanche signal occurs in APD 1, click signals occur in 
Comp A and Comp C, a situation that can be detected by a gate 
implementing the logic expression AB𝐶D. In contrast, if click 
signals are generated in both Comp B and Comp D, this means 
that a strong avalanche signal has occurred in APD 2 [Fig. 3, 
pulse (b)], which can be detected by a logic gate implementing 
ABCD. When a weak avalanche signal is generated in APD 1, 
only one click signal occurs, in Comp C [Fig. 3, pulse (c)]; it 
can be detected by a logic gate implementing AB𝐶D. When a 
click signal occurs only in Comp D, it means that a weak 
avalanche signal was generated in APD 2 [Fig. 3, pulse (d)]. 
This case can be detected by a logic gate implementing ABCD. 
If avalanche signals are generated in APD 1 and APD 2 
simultaneously, there is no signal in either Comp C or Comp D. 
This means that the avalanche signals were obscured by the 
blinding signals generated by Eve [Fig. 3, pulses (e) and (f)]. 
This case can be detected by a logic gate implementing ABCD, 
and indicates that an attempted blinding attack has occurred. 
Therefore, if the output of this logic gate is evaluated, a CM 
output signal can be generated by the FPGA to disable raw key 
generation, and thus prevent the attempted quantum hacking. 
FIG. 3. Block diagram and timing chart of the countermeasure scheme 
against blinding attacks in QKD systems with a balanced APD scheme. 
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V. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
The conceptual diagram of the setup to simulate an 
intercept-and-resend method on a practical P&P QKD is shown 
in Fig. 4(a). As discussed above, four entities are involved: 
Alice, Bob, Eve–Bob, and Eve–Alice. Eve–Bob is designed to 
incept a single photon that will be transmitted from Alice to 
Bob. In the intercept part of the simulated attack, Eve-Bob 
communicates with Alice as the same way of a conventional 
plug and play QKD system. In the resend part, Eve–Alice is 
designed to resend strong laser pulses for blinding attack after 
phase modulation as Eve-Bob’s guessing phase modulation 
information. As a result, Eve–Alice can control Bob’s APD 
click. 
We prove the performance of the new proposed 
countermeasure against blinding attacks on low-noise APDs 
through a proof-of-principle experimental setup composed of 
only Eve–Alice and Bob, as shown in Fig. 4(b). We incorporate 
all cases of phase modulation in the simplified Eve–Alice, 
instead of using the full intercept part setup, which includes 
also Eve–Bob and Alice, as shown in Fig. 4(a). The phase 
modulation timing is controlled by Bob’s FPGA; a driver (D) 
modulates the laser pulse phase. A VOA is located on Bob for 
experimental convenience. Bob’s FPGA (Altera Stratix 4) 
produces a 2 MHz clock signal to trigger a negative pulse 
generator (NPG; Avteck AVP-AV-1) used to drive a laser 
diode, and a positive pulse generator (PPG; Agilent 81160A) to 
drive the APDs (Princeton Lightwave PGA-308). The PPG 
generates periodic rectangular voltage pulses with 5-V 
amplitude and 2-ns width. Using a bias tee (Avteck AVX-T), 
the rectangular pulses are superimposed on a DC offset voltage, 
to operate the APD in gated Geiger mode. Concurrently, the 
NPG generates short negative 2 MHz pulses that drive a 
gain-switched distributed feedback laser diode (LD; NEC NX 
8563LB). We first measured the performance of the APDs in 
terms of quantum efficiency (QE) and dark count probability 
(DCP). Fig. 5 shows the behavior of QE and DCP versus bias 
voltage for both APDs. When the bias voltage increases above 
55 V, both QE and DCP increase gradually. We selected a 10 % 
QE to set up the APD; for this level of QE, DCP = 4 ×  10−5 
for APD 1, and DCP =  2 × 10−5 for APD 2. 
 The repeated laser pulses are attenuated to the range of 0.1–
500 photons/pulse through a VOA consisting of passive 
FIG. 4. (a) Conceptual diagram of the experimental setup for an intercept-and-resend method on a plug and play QKD system. (b) Proof-of-principle 
experimental setup for a blinding attack. 
 
FM: Faraday mirror; PM: Phase modulator; FPGA: Field-programmable gate array; SL: Storage line; VOA: Variable passive attenuator; PinPD: Pin photodiode; 
BS 90/10: Beam splitter 90:10; PBS: Polarization beam splitter; DL: Delay line; BS 50/50: Beam splitter 50:50; C: Circulator; LD: Laser diode; APD: Avalanche 
photodiode; PMC: Phase modulation controller; D: Driver (such as a PPG or NPG). 
FIG. 5. Quantum efficiency and dark count probability for APDs 1 and 2. 
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variable optical attenuators. Each attenuated laser pulse is split 
into two laser pulses by the BS 50/50, and one of the resulting 
pulses is delayed through the DL. The two laser pulses (first 
and second) are sent to Eve–Alice, where the second laser pulse 
is modulated from 0 to 3π/2 by the PM. The two laser pulses are 
then reflected by the FM, and the second laser pulse is 
modulated again by the PM [49]. When the two laser pulses 
arrive at Bob, the first laser pulse is modulated from 0 to π/2 by 
the PM. We use a delay function in the PPG to synchronize the 
timing of the gate pulses to that of the arriving photons. A 
thermoelectric cooler control module maintains the temperature 
at 233 K to prevent temperature variations, which might affect 
the measurement results. The APD output signals are connected 
directly to the comparator or the proposed CM scheme, with the 
balanced APD scheme described in Fig. 3 (not shown in Fig. 4). 
Table I summarizes the APD click information when 
performing intercept-and-resend methods. After the sifting 
process, click information using different bases for Alice and 
Bob has been removed. Only the equal bases cases remain and 
contribute to generate secure keys or increase QBER (as 
discussed in Section III). After the sifting process, three cases 
are possible, concerning the APD click information.  
Case A. Let us assume that Alice and Eve–Bob were using 
the same basis; in this case, only one of the two Eve–Bob APDs 
generates a click. As a result, Eve can correctly guess Alice’s 
phase information, and modulates that phase in the second laser 
pulse. If the phase is the same between Eve–Alice and Bob, a 
click occurs in APD 1. In this case, it is considered that Eve 
successfully controls Bob’s APD click, because Eve and Bob 
share the same phase information. It also means that, in this 
case, Eve can obtain all the sifting keys, as a result of her 
control over Bob’s APD clicks. 
Case B. Even though an APD click should occur in APD 1 or 
2 (depending on Eve-Alice’s and Bob’s PM), there is no APD 
click, because of the limited detection efficiency of the APDs. 
The detection efficiency of an APD is normally in the 1–20 % 
range. 
Case C. If Eve-Bob and Bob have different bases, both Eve–
Bob APDs will generate a click with a probability of 50 % 
(shadowed cells in Table I). This means that Eve may wrongly 
guess Bob’s phase information. Nevertheless, 50 % of the APD 
clicks in Bob will still generate sifting keys. The other 50 % of 
the APD clicks will, however, cause an increase in QBER, 
because Alice and Bob will have different phase information, 
even though they have the same basis. After the sifting process, 
the QBER will still remain high, and the increased QBER 
indicates the existence of Eve. 
It may therefore be concluded that case C, when Alice and 
Bob have the same basis, must be examined carefully, because 
it is the only case that may lead to an increase in QBER. Before 
describing in detail how to blind detectors that use a BNC 
scheme, we present (in Fig. 6) experimental measurement 
results of APD clicks versus incident photon flux for a 
conventional QKD system without a BNC scheme. In quantum 
hacking events such as the one described in Section II, the 
incident photon flux is one of the most important parameters. 
All cases in Table I are tested, except for (b)`, (c)`, (f)`, and (g)` 
because they are exactly the same as (b), (c), (f), and (g). The 
ideal avalanche count rates are calculated (the calculation 
details are presented in the Appendix). As expected, if there are 
no differences between Eve–Bob and Bob PMs (Case A), only 
one of the two APDs generates an avalanche with a probability 
of 100 %, as shown in Fig. 6(a), (d), (g), and (h). In these graphs, 
it is considered that Eve can control the APDs of Bob. Although 
the count rate of the other APD is also slightly increased owing 
to the erroneous count rates of optical and electrical devices, 
this effect is negligible.  
In contrast, if Eve–Bob and Bob PMs differ (Case C), the 
TABLE I. APD click information after sifting process. 
ALICE PM EVE-BOB PM EVE-BOB APD CLICK EVE-ALICE PM BOB PM BOB APD CLICK 
TYPE OF 
CASE 
GRAPH 
PHASE BASIS PHASE BASIS 
EVE-APD 1 
(BS) 
EVE-APD 2 
(CIR) 
PHASE BASIS PHASE BASIS 
APD 1 
(BS) 
APD 2 
(CIR) 
0 0 0 0 √ 
 
0 0 0 0 
√ 
 
CASE A (A) 
  
CASE B 
 
𝜋/2 1 0 0 
√ 
 
0 0 𝜋/2 1 50% 50% CASE C (B) 
 
√ 𝜋 0 𝜋/2 1 50% 50% CASE C (C) 
𝜋 0 0 0 
 
√ 𝜋 0 0 0  
√ CASE A (D) 
  
CASE B 
 
3𝜋/2 1 0 0 
√ 
 
0 0 𝜋/2 1 50% 50% CASE C  (B)` 
 
√ 𝜋 0 𝜋/2 1 50% 50% CASE C  (C)` 
0 0 𝜋/2 1 
√ 
 
𝜋/2 1 0 0 50% 50% CASE C (E) 
 
√ 3𝜋/2 1 0 0 50% 50% CASE C (F) 
𝜋/2 1 𝜋/2 1 √ 
 
𝜋/2 1 𝜋/2 1 
√ 
 
CASE A (G) 
  
CASE B 
 
𝜋 0 𝜋/2 1 
√ 
 
𝜋/2 1 0 0 50% 50% CASE C  (F)` 
 
√ 3𝜋/2 1 0 0 50% 50% CASE C  (G)` 
3𝜋/2 1 𝜋/2 1 
 
√ 3𝜋/2 1 𝜋/2 1  
√ CASE A (H) 
  
CASE B 
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click probability of APD 1 or APD 2 is 50 %, as shown in 
Fig. 6(b), (c), (e), and (f). In these graphs, both APDs have the 
same avalanche count rate, which may increase QBER. 
Therefore, Eve can be detected and its attempt at quantum 
hacking fails. 
However, if the QKD adopts a low-noise detector with 
balanced APDs as described in Section II, the hacking may still 
succeed, as shown in Fig. 7. Injecting multiple photons blinds 
the APDs, even if the phase information of Eve–Bob and Bob is 
different, and the outputs of both APD 1 and 2 come close to 
zero as the incident photons increase, because of avalanche 
signal cancellation; this is shown in Fig. 7(b), (c), (e) and (f). 
This is why any photon coincident photon counts are discarded 
because we are using two APDs. These graphs show that the 
avalanche count rate decreases sharply above 
100 photons/pulse, because avalanche signals occur at both 
APDs with almost 100 % of probability. In other words, the 
detectors become blind completely.  
We now evaluate the proposed countermeasure shown in Fig. 
3. Fig. 8 shows the avalanche count rates of Diff 1 [Diff amp 
output (-)] and Diff 2 [Diff amp output (+)] when Eve attempts 
a blinding attack on the P&P QKD system using balanced 
APDs shown in Fig. 4. The avalanche count rates of Diff 1 and 
Diff 2 increase sharply from 0 to 30 photons/pulse, and then 
decrease to zero above 100 photons/pulse. At the same time, the 
output signal of the CM increases sharply and its count rate 
saturates. Clearly, one can easily detect the blinding attack 
attempt by monitoring the CM count rate. Even though in Case 
FIG. 6. Avalanche count rates in the QKD system. Ideal (Ideal 1, 2) and 
measured count rates (APD1, 2) versus incident flux. Case A is represented 
by (a), (d), (g), and (h), and Case C by (b), (c), (e), and (f) (see Table I). 
FIG. 7. Avalanche count rates of the differential amplifier outputs (Diff1, 
Diff2) and detection of a blinding attack on a plug and play QKD system with a 
background cancellation scheme. Avalanche count rates versus incident flux. 
Case A is represented by (a), (d), (g), and (h), and Case C by (b), (c), (e), (f) (see 
Table I). 
FIG. 8. Differential amplifier output (Diff1, Diff2) and blinding attack 
detection using the proposed countermeasure scheme, when Eve attempts a 
blinding attack on a plug and play QKD system with a background noise 
cancellation scheme. Avalanche counts rate versus incident flux. All panels 
correspond to Case C (see Table I).  
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A Eve can control the APDs [as is the case in Fig. 7(a), (d), (g), 
and (h)], blinding attempts such as those in Fig. 7 (b), (c), (e), 
and (f) (Case C) are automatically detected. Eve cannot know 
the exact time when the control operation or blinding operation 
occurs, because Bob’s basis is randomly changed. Therefore, 
detecting the blinding attempt (and not the controlling 
operation) is sufficient as a countermeasure.  
The proposed countermeasure can only detect strong 
avalanche signal cancellations. This is sufficient, because at 
least 100 photons/pulse are required to blind the APDs, as 
shown in Fig. 7, and furthermore most photons provoke strong 
avalanches. For example, Fig. 9 shows the avalanche count 
ratio of the used APDs versus incident flux. As shown, the 
weak avalanche count ratio that is defined as weak avalanche 
counts/Total avalanche counts decreases gradually from 0.1 to 
50 photons/pulse. In contrast, the strong avalanche count ratio 
that is defined as strong avalanche counts/Total avalanche 
counts increases slowly from 0 to 50 photons/pulse, and then 
saturates at approximately 100 %. This means that above 
100 photons/pulse all avalanche signals correspond to strong 
avalanches.  
Fig. 10 indicates the QBER and the CM probability of 
success versus incident flux. The details on how the QBER 
caused by the different phase information between Eve-Bob 
and Bob was calculated are given in the Appendix. The CM 
probability of success is calculated from the measured data. As 
shown, the QBER decreases gradually from 0 to 
100 photons/pulse, and then stabilizes at 0 % above 
100 photons/pulse. If a single photon arrives at the APD, the 
QBER will be 25 %. This results from the fact that the total 
number of sifting key generation cases is 16 (see Table I), the 
total number of cases typifying Case C is 8, and the APD 
generates an error count with 50 % probability. Therefore, if a 
single photon arrives at an APD, an error count will result in 25 % 
of the cases, on average. The observed decrease in QBER 
below 100 photons/pulse results from the fact that the flux 
increase leads to an increase of the probability that both APDs 
will click. The APDs are becoming therefore increasingly blind 
and their net output approaches zero. If Eve attempts quantum 
hacking using a blinding attack, she should therefore use an 
incident flux higher than 100 photons/pulse, to control the 
APDs without any increase in QBER. If Eve tries to control 
using lower intensities than 100 photons/pulse, she will cause 
an increase in QBER and both Alice and Bob will easily 
recognize Eve’s existence. The CM success probability 
measures the probability of detecting Eve’s blinding attack 
attempt. It increases slowly from 0 to 100 photons/pulse, and 
then saturates at 100 % above 100 photons/pulse. As can be 
seen in Fig. 9, weak avalanche counts account for 
approximately 10 % of the total avalanche counts at low 
incident fluxes. Therefore, the CM success probability is 
approximately 85 % at 1 photon/pulse. However, the weak 
avalanche counts decrease steadily from 0 to 50 photons/pulse, 
and then becomes approximately zero at 100 photons/pulse. 
The CM success probability therefore also becomes 100 % in 
this range. This means that the proposed CM detects all the 
blinding attack attempts, and therefore constitutes a perfect 
protection for QKD systems for this type of attack. It should be 
noted that, even though the CM success probability is not 100 % 
for flux values below 100 photons/pulse, this does not imply an 
unprotected system, given that the QBER will also assist in 
detecting Eve’s presence.  
VI. DISCUSSION 
Fig. 11 shows another proposed countermeasure (CM) 
against quantum hacking of self-differencing APDs. The CM 
for self-differencing APDs consists of three amplifiers (Amp), 
FIG. 9. Weak and strong avalanche count ratios in APD 1 and 2 versus 
incident flux. 
FIG. 10. Quantum bit error rate (QBER) and countermeasure (CM) success 
probability versus incident flux. 
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three comparators (Comp A, Comp B, and Comp C), and an 
FPGA. The APD output signal is split into two output signals 
by splitter 1 (S1). One of the APD output signals is connected 
to Comp A, which can detect an avalanche signal only when a 
strong avalanche occurs. The other APD output signal is 
transferred to splitter 2 (S2), where it is split once more. Next, 
the differential amplifier subtracts the delayed part from the 
signal. Finally, the negative and positive outputs of Diff Amp 
are sent to Comp B and C, respectively. The table inset in 
Fig. 11 shows the truth table for the logic gate implemented in 
the FPGA. If Comp A generates a click signal, then a click 
signal of Comp C should exist in the same time slot and a click 
signal of Comp B should be generated in the next time slot 
(because of the delay line in the negative input of the Diff Amp). 
If there is no signal in Comp B and Comp C with a click signal 
in Comp A, this means that the APD is blinded ( ABC ). 
Therefore, if we measure the logic gate of ABC, we can detect 
blinding attack attempts from the avalanche signal cancellation. 
In addition, the proposed CM can detect and distinguish other 
cases of click information in the APD. If a strong avalanche 
signal occurs in the APD, the Diff Amp generates an output 
signal in its positive output port [Fig. 11, pulse (a)]. This case 
can be detected with a gate implementing the logic expression 
AB𝐶; the avalanche signal from pulse (a) will also cause a 
strong avalanche signal in the delayed APD output, and the Diff 
Amp will therefore generate an output signal in its negative 
output port [Fig. 11, pulse (b)], which can be measured by a 
logic gate implementing A𝐵C. Even though Comp A and Comp 
B do not generate any signal in this case, Comp C generates a 
click signal ( AB𝐶 ), which expresses the fact that a weak 
avalanche signal occurred in the APD [Fig. 11, pulse (c)]. Even 
though a weak avalanche signal occurs in the delayed APD 
output, the Diff Amp generates a click signal in the positive 
output port, because the weak avalanche signal is removed 
owing to a blinding signal in the APD output generated by Eve 
[Fig. 11, pulse (d)]. In the next period, a strong avalanche signal 
occurs in the APD output. However, the Diff Amp does not 
generate any signal, because a blinding signal generated by Eve 
cancels the strong avalanche signal [Fig. 11, pulse (e)]. This 
case can be detected by a logic gate implementing ABC; a CM 
output signal indicating a quantum hacking attempt can 
therefore be generated by the FPGA. We believe that by 
applying such a CM scheme to QKD systems with 
self-differencing APDs, these systems can be fully protected 
from intercept-and-resend methods using APD blinding.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 We developed a new countermeasure against blinding 
attacks on low-noise, avalanche photon detectors using a 
background noise cancellation method in plug and play QKD 
systems. The effectiveness of the new countermeasure in 
detecting APD blinding attempts was successfully 
demonstrated. Our countermeasure scheme can be invaluable in 
overcoming the security limitations of avalanche photon 
detectors using a background noise cancellation method. 
APPENDIX 
The ideal avalanche count rate when the same phase occurs 
(𝐴𝑉𝐶𝑂𝑛𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑘) can be expressed by 
 𝐴𝑉𝐶𝑂𝑛𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑘 = µ𝐴𝑃𝐷 × 𝑄𝐸 × 𝑓𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒  , (1) 
where µ𝐴𝑃𝐷 , 𝑄𝐸 , and 𝑓𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒  are, respectively, the average 
number of photons per laser pulse in the APD, the APD 
quantum efficiency, and the frequency of the gate pulses. In 
contrast, when different phases occur, the ideal avalanche count 
rate (𝐴𝑉𝐶𝐵𝑜𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑠) is calculated using 
 𝐴𝑉𝐶𝐵𝑜𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑠 =
µ𝐴𝑃𝐷×𝑄𝐸 ×𝑓𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒
2
. (2) 
The QE is selected as 10 % (from Fig. 6) and 𝑓𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 2 MHz, 
as generated by the PPG. The average number of photons per 
laser pulse in the APDs (µ𝐴𝑃𝐷) is calculated by 
 µ𝐴𝑃𝐷 =
𝑛
10
(
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
10 )
 , (3) 
where 𝑛 and 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  are the number of photons in the laser 
pulses and the total attenuation ratio in the QKD system, 
respectively. The number of photons in the laser pulses (𝑛) can 
be expressed by 
 𝑛 =
𝐸𝑃𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒
𝐸𝑃ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛
 (4) 
FIG. 11. Block diagram and timing chart of the countermeasure scheme 
against blinding attacks in QKD systems using a self-differencing scheme. 
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where 𝐸𝑃𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒  is the total energy of the laser pulse and 𝐸𝑃ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛 
is the energy of a single photon of 0.7999 eV at 1.55 µm. The 
value of 𝐸𝑃𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒  can be obtained by 
 𝐸𝑃𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑠 =
𝑃𝐴𝑣𝑒
𝑅
, (5) 
where 𝑃𝐴𝑣𝑒  and 𝑅 are the average optical power of the laser 
pulses and their repetition rate, respectively. The value of 𝑃𝐴𝑣𝑒  
can be measured by an optical power meter; 𝑅 is 2 MHz, as 
generated by an NPG. We can calculate 𝑛 using Eq. (4) and Eq. 
(5). 
The value of 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is calculated by 
 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑏 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑏, (6) 
where 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑏 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒  and 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑏  are the attenuation ratio 
from Bob to Eve–Alice, and the attenuation ratio in Bob, 
respectively. The value of 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑏  can be measured by an 
optical power meter; the value of 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑏 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒  can be 
obtained by 
 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑏 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 10 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑛
µ
𝐸𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒
), (7) 
where µ𝐸𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒  is the average number of photons per laser 
pulse in Eve–Alice. The average number of photons is 
determined by the attenuation ratio in the VOA. We can 
calculate the average number of photons per laser pulse in the 
APDs (µ𝐴𝑃𝐷) using Eq. (4) and Eq. (6). Having done that, and 
using Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), we can calculate the ideal avalanche 
count rate (Ideal 1 and 2 in Fig. 6). 
When a laser pulse with an average number of photons per 
pulse µ arrives at the APD, we may consider two click 
probabilities: the single click probability 𝑝1(µ), and the double 
click probability 𝑝2(µ): 
 𝑝1(µ) → 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅1 =
1
2
, (8) 
 𝑝2(µ) → 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅2 = 0. (9) 
Applying these probabilities to a QKD system with a total 
number of N laser pulses, we obtain: 
- When Eve-Bob and Bob have the same basis, 
 
𝑁
2
× 𝑝2(µ) → 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅 = 0. (10) 
- When Eve-Bob and Bob have different bases, 
 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑘 =  
𝑁
2
× 𝑝1(µ) → 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅 (11) 
 𝐷𝑜𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑘 =  
𝑁
2
× 𝑝2(µ) → 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅 = 0. (12) 
The QBER caused by the different phase (𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒) can 
be expressed by  
 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 =
𝑁
2
 ×𝑝1(µ)×
1
2
𝑁
2
 ×𝑝𝑠(µ)+
𝑁
2
 ×𝑝1(µ)
. (13) 
The CM success probability (𝑝𝐶𝑀) can therefore be expressed 
by: 
 𝑝𝐶𝑀 =
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑣𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠+𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠
× 100. (14) 
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